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ABSTRACT 
Feminist theory, in both its identity-based and its anti-essentialist versions, has denied the validity of transgendered people's 
experience. Rather, feminism needs to retheorize its understanding of identity in light of new insights offered by transgendered people's 
experience into the structural and systemic production of "liminal" or "boundary" conditions within political communities. 
RESUME 
La theorie feministe dans ses deux versions 1'une basee sur l'identit£ et l'autre anti-essentialiste a rejete la validite de 1'experience des 
transgenderistes. Le feminisme devrait plutot remettre en theorie sa comprehension de 1'identitd en tenant compte de 1'experience des 
transgenderistes dans la production structurelle et systemique des conditions "limitrophes" ou "frontieres" au sein des communautes 
politiques. 
INTRODUCTION 
Feminist theorists have responded to the 
emerging political movement of transgendered 
people and the corresponding theorization of 
transgendered identities in a variety of ways, all of 
them disquieting.1 By turns, feminists have 
denounced transgendered people as dangerous to 
feminism, depoliticized the experiences of 
transgendered people, or celebrated the 
transgendered identity as emblematic of the 
subversive character of feminist postmodern theory. 
None of these positions is adequate to the real 
challenges that transgendered people offer to the 
categories of both identity-based and postmodern 
feminist theorizing. 
A l l too frequently feminism's relationship 
to transgender politics has been expressed as one of 
direct hostility and exclusion. The classic (and until 
quite recently, nearly the exclusive) feminist 
statement on the issue of transsexualism was Janice 
Raymond's book, Transsexual Empire: The Making 
of the She-Male. Raymond's dramatic opposition of 
feminism to transgendered people and politics is 
made clear throughout; it is perhaps most evident 
when she likens the transsexual woman to a rapist: 
A l l transsexuals rape women's bodies by 
reducing the real female form to an 
artifact, appropriating this body for 
themselves. However, the transsexually 
constructed lesbian-feminist violates 
women's sexuality and spirit, as well. 
Rape, although it is usually done by force, 
can also be accomplished by deception. 
(1979, 104) 
This reasoning has regularly been used to justify the 
exclusion of transgendered women from 
women-only services, events, gatherings.2 And, 
while transgendered women are portrayed as 
utilizing a Trojan Horse style of infiltration and 
violation of the "safe space" of the women's 
community, transgendered men are, in turn, often 
treated as dupes of the patriarchy and as traitors to 
their sex, as women who might have been "sisters 
in the struggle," but who instead joined the ranks of 
(presumably always anti-feminist) men. Raymond, 
in fact, treats transgendered men not as choosing 
their transition, but as having it inflicted upon them 
as patriarchy's way of destroying women who 
challenge femininity: 
...the aim would be to assimilate those 
women who do not conform to the male 
standards of femininity. It is important to 
understand that assimilation equals 
elimination. Not being able to assimilate 
would-be males into the feminine, 
patriarchy assimilates them into the 
masculine. (1979, xxiii) 
While Raymond's position seems extreme 
in its gender determinism, it reflects a deep 
ambivalence in the relationship of feminism to the 
question of gender. We find simultaneously the 
contradictory positions that gender is an inherently 
patriarchal structure that women can, indeed must, 
defeat or transcend, and that gendered femininity is 
itself an expression of feminism. This latter position 
is expressed in terms of, for example, the belief in 
an inherent strength, spirituality, sexuality, and/or 
creativity that women can draw upon. Gender is 
viewed as mutable and socially constructed while, 
in the same breath, it is contradictorily presented as 
determined immutably by one's assigned sex at 
birth and upbringing. No thought is given to the 
unique perspectives that transgendered people 
might have to contribute to the understanding of 
gender experience, gender relations or of women's 
oppression. 
Perhaps the more common, but less vocal 
attitude of most feminists has been to sidestep 
transgender issues as inherently apolitical. The 
assumption has been, by feminists and by society 
more generally, that transsexualism is a medical or 
psychiatric problem, and therefore the private 
concern of rare individuals. Again, with this 
attitude, transgender experience is effectively 
eliminated from political concern; the gender 
concerns raised by transgendered individuals are 
not incorporated into feminist theories of gender at 
all . 3 
More recently, postmodern feminist theory 
has begun to embrace transgender as an expression 
of diversity and difference, and as playing a 
strategic role in breaking down the binary dualisms 
of Western metaphysical thought. The new pluralist 
celebration of diversity is certainly vastly preferable 
to the hostility or dismissiveness expressed in other 
models of feminism. Nevertheless, it may run the 
same risks as liberal tolerance of difference, which 
in the end does little to recognize the specificity of 
particular subject positions. In its promotion of 
transgender identity as a transcendence of identity, 
postmodern theory assimilates transgender to its 
own intellectual project through presenting 
transgendered experience as chimera, play, 
performance or strategy. It does so at the expense 
of investigating the actual lives, political demands, 
or feelings expressed by transgendered people of 
having an identity that is often experienced as 
"authentic" or "integral" and that is considered to be 
neither "chosen" originally nor "performed" 
strategically. This point is well made by K i 
Namaste in her critique of some of the directions 
taken by postmodern-influenced queer theory: 
In recent years, the field known as queer 
theory has witnessed a veritable explosion 
of essays, presentations, and books on the 
subjects of drag, gender, performance, and 
transsexuality. Yet these works have 
shown very little concern for those who 
identify and live as drag queens, 
transsexuals, and/or transgenders. The 
violation of compulsory sex/gender 
relations is one of the topics most 
frequently addressed by critics in queer 
theory. These discussions, however rarely 
consider the implications of an enforced 
sex/gender system for people who live 
outside it....[C]ritics in queer theory write 
page after page on the inherent liberation 
in the transgression of gender codes but 
they have nothing to say about the 
precarious position of the transsexual 
woman who is battered, and who is unable 
to access a women's shelter because she 
was not born a biological woman. 
(1996, 183-4) 
It is my argument that transgender politics 
and transgendered people's experiences must be 
taken seriously by both more traditional gender 
identity-based feminism and contemporary 
postmodern feminism. In addressing transgender 
politics' challenge to the boundaries of gender 
identity, traditional feminist approaches need to 
critique their own exclusionary practices, and 
challenge their own understanding of gender and 
sexuality. In the direct and visceral terms in which 
transgendered people experience the boundaries 
and instability of identity that are celebrated in the 
postmodern feminist theoretical approach, the latter 
must take seriously the demand for a more 
programmatic agenda for postmodern feminist 
thought. 
In what follows, my arguments are based 
on the insights that may be gained from examining 
transgender as an "identity." It is my hope that out 
of examining the distinctive contributions of 
transgender identity to identity politics, new 
grounds may be found for alliances among varied 
social movements. These grounds would be based 
not in identity as much as in understanding and in 
a recognition of the power of exclusion. 
TRANSGENDER IDENTITY POLITICS 
The growth of new social movements, 
organized around the salient experiences of 
oppression of different identity groups, has 
engendered a corresponding intellectual study of 
identities, of how we come to acquire an identity, of 
what an identity means, and of how identities 
become socially recognized, defined, and 
politicized. Each identity-based social movement 
has made unique contributions to these debates. 
The transgender political movement has 
only recently gained public recognition. Alongside 
this newfound political status, new ways of 
conceptualizing and defining what transgender 
means are also emerging. And, as with other 
identity-based movements, transgender politics is 
providing singular challenges to how we think 
about identities and their politicization. In what 
follows, I argue that what transgender identity 
specifically problematizes is identity itself. 
Transgender identity is about identity experienced 
as problematic; the experience of being transgender 
problematizes the relationship of the self to the 
body, and the self to others. In doing so, it also 
problematizes issues of identity boundaries, 
stability and coherence. 
I also intend that, as with the study of 
other identity groups, the insights that can be 
gained from an exploration of transgender identity 
do not apply only to transgendered people, but can 
be extended to other identities as well. 
IDENTITY AS PROBLEM 
The term "transgender" has only very 
recently come into popular and political use, and its 
definition is critical to the politics that it engenders. 
The term, as I use it, includes all those people 
whose internally felt sense of core gender identity 
does not correspond to their assigned sex at birth or 
in which they were raised. This includes people 
who identify with the gender other than that 
assigned at birth as well as those who do not 
identify with any gender at all. It includes those 
who present themselves in their originally assigned 
sex, as well as those who present themselves in the 
sex which coheres with their actual identity (and 
therefore may include non- and pre- and 
post-operative transsexual people) and those who 
move back and forth between self-presentation as 
women and as men. It also includes those whose 
gender presentation is ambiguous in ways which 
don't permit them to present as either gendered 
male or female. In this usage, the term does not 
include those who are both physically and 
emotionally comfortable in their assigned sex and 
gender, even while they are challenging the social 
meanings that have been traditionally assigned to 
that sex and gender. What is radical, then, to the 
definition of "transgender" is its origin in a 
problem, a disjunction between one's feelings of 
who one is or is not, and how one is (or has once 
been) perceived, recognized, and understood by 
others. 
Gender and sex are both complex terms, 
whose complexity is not acknowledged in their 
daily usage. Sex includes, at a minimum, 
chromosomal sex, gonadal sex, hormonal sex, 
internal reproductive organs, external genitals, 
assigned sex, and gender role (Nataf 1996, 14). 
Much scientific evidence not only points to the 
non-congruence of all these variables in all cases, 
but also to their non-binary nature. Despite this, it 
is customary to presume the presence of two and 
only two fully congruent and "opposite" sexes, 
male and female. Moreover, external genitalia 
remain the primary factor in attributing sex 
(O'Donovan, cited in Nataf, 14; Kessler in Nelson 
and Robinson 1995, 13). 
Gender, in turn, is expected to cohere 
unproblematically with sex. But gender too 
involves a rich complex of variables, including: 
gender assignment (which generally takes place at 
birth, after which it is considered immutable); roles 
(specific social activities which are assigned 
masculine and feminine status); identity (one's 
internally felt or experienced sense of being either 
male or female); status (social rank which is 
accorded to males or females or those performing 
masculine or feminine roles); relations (socially 
appropriate behaviours evinced by males or females 
in relation to other males and females); attribution 
(perception by others of one's sex that takes place in 
all social interaction); behaviour (use of the 
gestures, mannerisms, language, clothing, 
comportment considered appropriate to one's 
biological sex); and biology (genetic or 
sexual-physical predeterminants of any of the 
above).4 
What transgender identity is about is 
identity as the incoherence of these elements, as the 
felt incoherence of self and body; it is identity as 
non-identity of the self, according to one of the 
principle means by which the coherence of the self 
is supposed to be unconsciously achieved. For some 
transgendered people, the experience of a non-
coherence of body and self is a permanent 
condition; for others, this coherence is achieved as 
a conscious, very often medicalized process. 
Much of what is unique about transgender 
identity, as an identity, is this reference to the 
identity as, in itself, problematic, as based in the 
profound sense of gender "dysphoria," of a 
disruption between one's sense of one's own gender 
and one's body. It is therefore simultaneously a 
problem of the relationship of self to self 
(mind/body) and self to others (the individual to 
culture, society, etc.) Transgender politics points to 
the refusal of this problem to be exclusively 
resolved either at the individual level or at the 
societal level. 
The individual solutions (self-denial, 
passing, surgical sex re-assignment) are, to many, 
unacceptable. As Kate Bornstein remarks, 
regarding the advice given to post-operative 
transsexuals to "invent" a new childhood, and a 
new past for oneself, and to destroy evidence of 
one's previous sex: "transsexuality is the only 
condition for which the therapy is to lie" (1994, 
62). Non-recognition, or discontinuity between 
one's felt self and the perception of others merely 
continues in a new guise. These solutions also 
ignore the voices of those who feel that their gender 
cannot be recognized within the binary categories 
of male and female, and who wish to create a space 
for recognition of themselves as transgender, third 
sex, two-spirited, intersex, epicene, or androgyne.5 
While individual solutions seem 
inadequate in their repetition of the denial, 
incoherence, or intransigence of the transgender 
condition, solutions at the societal level are frankly 
insensitive to the specific needs of transgendered 
people, and not infrequently Utopian in their goals. 
The desire to move to a point where "gender doesn't 
matter," either through the abolition of gender (one 
of the goals of many versions of feminist politics), 
or through the proliferation of gender in 
performance and play (the postmodern feminist 
take on the problem) has wide appeal and 
credibility (including within the transgendered 
community), but too often is used as an excuse 
either to criticize or deny the experiences of 
transgendered people. 
In light of this, I must remark upon how 
the pronouncement that "gender shouldn't matter" 
is used by many feminists to portray transgendered 
people as inherently gender conformists, and 
consequently anti-feminist in their politics. First, it 
is necessary to acknowledge that the use (both 
playful and serious) of stereotypes and gender 
conformity may be a very real pleasure for those 
who have long desired recognition in their gender. 
And, aside from the strong likelihood that some 
transgendered people will feel relief and pleasure in 
a new gender role, this unfair criticism serves to 
stereotype all transgendered people and denies the 
existence of those - and they are many - who also 
challenge those stereotypes. As well, it should be 
emphasized that stereotypically gendered behaviour 
and attitudes are often a prerequisite for being taken 
seriously as transgendered, especially by the 
medical community, on whom transgendered 
people are entirely reliant for receiving hormones 
or surgery. And, further to all of this, an appropriate 
rejoinder to the critic might be, simply, that one 
way of being gender-nonconformist is to refuse to 
accept the mandatory congruence of sex and 
gender. 
Further to this, there has been insufficient 
recognition among feminists who do not experience 
a core sense of gender-incongruity, of their own 
participation in maintaining a rigid binary 
sex/gender system. With the goal of ending 
women's oppression, feminists have themselves 
often maintained gender systems, albeit 
"alternative" ones, designed to stand in direct 
opposition to those of the dominant society. These 
are manifest throughout feminist writing and 
organizing. One sees them in the continued 
assignment of femininity and masculinity to 
specific behaviours, in the differential treatment of 
women and men, in the celebration of specific 
aspects of femininity (often, and justifiably, to 
redress the common social repudiation of these 
human qualities and characteristics by mainstream 
society). Similarly, the gay and lesbian 
communities, while clearly challenging the 
heterosexual norms that are corollary to the 
sex/gender system, and while often creating 
welcoming space for androgynous people, for 
passing men and women, and for a range of gender 
expression, have nonetheless not questioned deeply 
what it means to be attracted to a particular "sex." 
Far too often, transgendered people are criticized 
for changing or desiring to change their sex, for not 
having "transcended" the link of body to gender 
expressed as "sex," by others who readily and 
comfortably desire a "sex," an embodied gender. 
From both the feminist and the gay and lesbian 
communities, the critique of traditional gender 
systems has stayed at the level of criticizing the 
attribution of specific gender behaviours to specific 
sexes, and not moved beyond this to consider the 
implications of having a gender at the level of 
personal identity. It needs to be said that few among 
the non-transgendered have pondered for long the 
luxury of living in a body that feels at ease and 
consonant with the self. 
The criticism that transgendered people 
have too great an investment in gender finds a 
strong opponent in the new postmodern celebration 
of transgender as transcending gender. But this 
postmodern reading of transgender, too, 
unfortunately effaces much of the transgender 
experience. When Kate Bomstein (1994), a 
transgender performance artist, comments in 
distinctly postmodern tones on the fluidity she has 
found in her expression of identity, she writes: 
I love the idea of being without an 
identity, it gives me a lot of room to play 
around; but it makes me dizzy, having 
nowhere to hang my hat. When I get too 
tired of not having an identity, I take one 
on: it doesn't really matter what identity I 
take on, as long as it's recognizable. I can 
be a writer, a lover, a confidante, a 
femme, a top, or a woman. I retreat into 
definition as a way of demarcating my 
space, a way of saying "Step back, I'm 
getting crowded here." (39) 
Yet what is significant about Bornstein's 
list of chosen identities is its limitations, as much as 
its freedom. Despite what she says, it does indeed 
matter to her what identity she takes on; it matters 
that it be "recognizable." Elsewhere in her book, 
she remarks: 
I've no idea what "a woman" feels like. I 
never did feel like a girl or a woman; 
rather, it was my unshakable conviction 
that I was not a boy or a man. It was the 
absence of feeling, rather than its 
presence, that convinced me to change my 
gender...Gender identity answers another 
question: "to which gender (class) do I 
want to belong?" Being and belonging are 
closely related concepts when it comes to 
gender. I felt I was a woman (being), and 
more importantly, I felt I belonged with 
the other women (belonging). (24) 
Bornstein is among the most 
postmodern-influenced of current transgender 
activists. This is evident in her discussion of the 
fluidity of identity, the problem of categorization. 
And yet even in this celebration of difference and 
non-identity, Bornstein's work reflects something 
which the postmodern advocation of the 
proliferation of all identities and all categories 
cannot explain - the sense of authenticity of a 
particular identity or closed set of identities. 
Bornstein is representative of, as Califia argues, the 
more recent political transgender activists who have 
been influenced by feminism, postmodernism, and 
sexual liberation politics. So it is striking the degree 
to which even while arguing for postmodern 
post-identity, she continues to adhere to the "truth" 
of certain experiences and identities. 
Much of what is published about 
transgender identity takes autobiographical form, 
and throughout these autobiographies, the authors 
deal with the problem of how to describe to others 
the need for an integrated and authentic sense of 
self, and the relief that comes through attaining this 
in sex reassignment. To take only one example, 
Max Wolf Valerio explains: 
I think most people don't understand how 
transsexuals feel about our original 
biological selves. Everyone experiences 
this discontinuity between identity and 
body slightly differently, but there's a 
commonality. For me, it wasn't so much 
that I hated my body or hated being a 
woman. First of all, even as I say that I 
was a woman, that feels as though 
somehow, it really wasn't true. At some 
point, I realized that my deepest, most 
abiding sense of myself was male. When 
1 saw that there was an alternative, that the 
hormones really work, I knew that I would 
rather live my life as a man. As a man, a 
more integrated sense of myself began to 
emerge. (Feinberg 1996, 142) 
Perhaps, in responding to the postmodern 
challenge to the fixity or stability of identity, what 
we discover is that there is a range of identities 
within which one can "manoeuvre" but the 
transgender experience suggests that there are 
limitations, too, on one's sense of who one is, 
outside of which one feels oneself harmed, 
mis-recognized, mis-taken. To extend this 
challenge beyond transgender is to suggest to other 
identity politics movements that it is still necessary 
to discover the problematic aspect of an identity 
that is too readily overlooked in the claiming of, for 
example, lesbian, gay or bisexual pride, or of 
feminist consciousness. 
IDENTITY AS CONTESTED 
Transgendered people's experience of 
gender identity as inherently problematic is 
compounded by the experience of it as both 
contested and contestable. One's gender is, of 
course, not one's own decision. Typically assigned 
at birth, it is, happily one supposes, experienced by 
most people as unproblematic. When issues arise 
over it, they usually regard the content socially 
accorded to gender (of socially appropriate 
femininity or masculinity, for example, and these in 
turn are often further specified within class or race 
dynamics), not the assignment of gender itself. 
Feminists, for example, and rightly, struggle over 
changing the meaning of what it is to be a woman, 
expanding the boundaries of possibilities to allow 
for greater freedom in women's (and men's) lives. 
Transgender politics, on the other hand, is often 
about how the categories of, and the boundary 
between, male and female, or masculine and 
feminine, are set at all. 
There are at least two sites in which the 
contestation over transgender identity takes place. 
The more obvious is, of course, the entire social 
sphere of the transgendered person's life. Virtually 
no social spaces exist in which the existence of 
transgendered people is recognized and accepted. 
The lesbian, gay and bisexual movement protests 
the presumption of heterosexuality; the transgender 
movement protests the even more common 
presumption of sex/gender identity congruity. For 
transgendered people, to "come out" as 
transgendered means frequently to have one's 
gender identity disputed, contested, disbelieved, or 
fully denied. Having to prove to others that you 
really are who you say you are is a task which 
might appear surreal if it weren't also, for many 
transgendered people, quotidian. 
Transgendered people are faced with a 
limited range of options for living with an identity 
that is both felt within as problematic and 
continuously contested by the society without. 
Many choose medical intervention and surgical sex 
reassignment. But doing so requires confronting 
another site in which one's transgender identity is 
contested, in which further "proof is required. 
Transgender identity is eligible for medical 
intervention in accordance with its status as a 
psychiatric condition, currently listed as "gender 
dysphoria" for which the diagnosis is based on a 
fixed set of diagnostic criteria. Transgendered 
people seeking sex reassignment must prove to a 
committee of medical authorities that they indeed 
meet these criteria. More than one author has noted 
the conservative effect of these measures -
individuals seeking medical assistance are usually 
both aware of, and fully prepared to conform to 
whatever criteria they understand will provide them 
with the medical diagnosis needed for 
sex-reassignment surgery and hormone treatment to 
be offered. Thus, the diagnostic tools are repeatedly 
confirmed in this process. 
Aside from the considerable social stigma 
of claiming an identity which is also considered a 
psychiatric disorder, the medicalization of 
transgendered people also may be experienced as 
disempowering; one's own identity can be disputed 
or overturned by a panel of medical personnel. The 
Standards of Care: The Hormonal and Surgical Sex 
Reassignment of Gender Dysphoric Persons6 also 
leaves little room for individual variations or 
preferences of transgendered people in determining 
the course of any medical assistance they may seek. 
A rigid binary gender system remains the basis for 
evaluating and reassigning sex. 
Despite all the difficulties presented in the 
medical treatment of transgendered people, there is 
very real concern and debate in the transgendered 
community that the demedicalization of "gender 
dysphoria" would put an end to all insurance 
coverage of drugs or surgery, effectively putting 
surgical options out of reach for all but the most 
wealthy. Ironically, the very site of contestation of 
an identity also serves societally, in many respects, 
as its validation and support. 
IDENTITY AS LUMINAL 
Postmodern theory has introduced the 
concept of "liminality" as critical to our 
understanding of identities. What is liminal is on 
the threshold, the edge, or the border, the 
"no-man's" land that exists in places between 
borders, where no rules hold, where contests over 
authority sometimes take place. The concept of the 
liminal is valuable for critical thinking, for asking 
questions about what establishes the boundary 
limits of the categories we use, and for considering 
how these categories can be destabilized, or how 
these boundaries are transgressed. At times, 
however, postmodern theorists risk romanticizing 
this concept of liminality. Living on borderlines 
becomes a kind of thought experiment, either 
explored in the intellectual and academic arena, in 
the often esoteric literature and filmic 
representations of liminality as the principal arena 
for the contestation of meanings, or in the personal 
arena as a kind of recreational play. 
Transgender identity is useful in giving 
flesh to this postmodern conceptualization of 
"liminality" in identity. Because transgender 
identity is experienced as exclusion from or harm 
by the existing categories of "gender," it provokes 
the question of how those categories are 
established. How are they maintained? How are the 
boundaries of what is normal "policed?" How can 
they be transgressed? Transgendered people often 
experience, and frequently painfully so, living on 
these borders, and the costs of transgressing them. 
To the degree that the categories 
themselves, and the social investment in 
maintaining them, are politicized, transgender 
politics raise questions of how one disrupts and 
destabilizes existing category boundaries. In doing 
so, transgender politics directly challenge the 
stabilization of category boundaries that has 
become part of the quest of many other 
identity-based movements (i.e. who qualifies as gay 
or lesbian, who can be a feminist, who is a woman, 
etc.) 
The category of "transgender" also rapidly 
proliferates in interesting ways suggesting that there 
may be unique aspects to the creation of any sort of 
solidarity within the transgendered movement. 
Consider the range of M T F , F T M , non-op, pre-op, 
post-op, third sex, androgyne, epicene, two-spirited, 
and intersexed identities. When one considers as 
well that transgendered people frequently go 
through transitions which move them from one of 
these categories into another, one gets a sense too 
of the fluidity of identifications that transgendered 
people may experience. Transgendered people may 
also experience leaving the identity of 
"transgendered" behind, as they, through surgery or 
hormones, come to experience a sense of 
mind/body and societal/self congruity more typical 
of the non-transgendered. Add to this that all of the 
categories are, of course, made infinitely more 
complex by the necessary intersection of all 
transgendered identities with the full range of class, 
race, sexual orientation, cultural and other identities 
(and that all of these have an effect on how gender, 
and with it, transgender, will be experienced). 
CONCLUSIONS 
The effect of these challenges and of these 
distinctive aspects of transgendered identity is to 
emphasize the need for alternative bases for social 
movement politics. Transgender politics is not (and, 
I would argue, cannot be) based on identities that 
are experienced as solid, permanent, exclusionary, 
whole. Rather it is in the nature of the identity itself 
to be problematic, contested, transgressive, and 
liminal. It is in the capacity of the identity to 
indicate spaces of liminality and difference within 
itself that presents new challenges to previous 
theoretical paradigms of identity formation. If 
transgendered identity is experienced in this way, it 
serves also to problematize and contest other 
identity categories, and the politics that stem from 
them. 
To a very large degree, these aspects of 
transgender identity have appeared to align it most 
closely with postmodern theory in its celebration of 
fluidity, dispersal, liminality, and so forth. But I 
argue that what characterizes transgender identity 
can also serve to indicate some of the limitations of 
the postmodern theoretical approach. Too often 
postmodern approaches validate difference at a 
linguistic level without considering the lived 
experience of difference. Outside of concrete 
proposals for social change, such an approach 
seriously risks minimizing the experience of really 
living on borderlines, of the incoherence that often 
accompanies shifts in identity, of the difficulty in 
establishing a self that can withstand its 
contestation, and thus risk taking an attitude of 
indifference or complacency toward these 
experiences. To postmodern theory, transgender 
argues, then, for the reality of difference, and the 
need to investigate the social structures which 
enforce sex/gender identity congruity and stability 
at every level. 
To identity-based feminist theory, on the 
other hand, transgender politics argues for a 
destabilization of the categories of woman and man, 
of lesbian, gay and bisexuals. Instead, I argue that 
what transgendered identity politics generates is 
new motivation to move beyond identity as the 
basis of social movement politics and into new 
exploration of the ethical bases of alliances and 
formation of communities. As well, and critically, 
it demands an exploration of the structural and 
systemic production of "contested" and "liminal" 
sites within every political community, including 
feminism, and the responsibility for breaking down 
the exclusionary and limiting effects that these 
boundaries have on us all. 
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ENDNOTES 
1 The term "transgender" was first brought into use by Virginia Prince in her book, The Transvestite and his Wife. While the term has 
the narrower definition (intended by Prince) of non-operative transsexual, I have chosen, following current usage in the transgendered 
community, to use it in its broader sense which is meant to include transsexuals, transgendered people, intersexed individuals, 
androgynes, etc. In the text that follows I use the term "transgendered men" and "transgendered women" so that gender attribution 
refers to the identity claimed by the person concerned, regardless of their sex assignment at birth or status as pre- or post-operative 
transsexual. This is at odds with medical convention which generally continues to refer to people according to their birth-sex up until, 
and even after sex-reassignment. 
2. One of the more notable instances of this has been the Michigan Women's Festival's institution of a "womyn-born-womyn only" 
policy created to exclude transgendered women from the site. See Califia, pp. 277-279. Another instance was the threatened boycott 
of Olivia Records, a feminist recording label, in the wake of the publication of Raymond's book, in which Raymond criticized Olivia 
for having Sandy Stone, a transgendered woman, as a member of their collective. After several months of receiving hate mail, death 
threats and threats of assault, and fearing the financial collapse of the business, Stone was asked to leave the collective. See Califia, 
pp. 106-7 and Sandy Stone, "The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto," in Julia Epstein and Kristina Straub, eds., Body 
Guards: The Cultural Politics of Gender Ambiguity, (New York and London: Routledge), pp. 280-304 . 
3. The exception to this might be, again, where the transsexual experience is then appropriated to the feminist demand to change the 
attributions of specific gender characteristics to a particular sex. This approach assumes that gender attributes or roles always equal 
gender identity. Transsexuals who undergo sex change are thereby understood as lost to the feminist project. 
Margrit Eichler, for example, argues that "transsexuals are people who suffer so deeply from the sex structure that they are 
willing to endure terrible pain and loneliness in order to reduce their suffering. This group of people would - potentially - be the most 
potent group of people pressing for changes in the sex structure, because their aversion to 'sex appropriate' roles is apparently 
insurmountable. By declaring them, by surgical fiat, as members of the other sex, this change potential is diverted and becomes as 
conservative as it could have been revolutionary" (Eichler, "Sex Change Operations: The Last Bulwark of the Double Standard" in 
E D . Nelson and B. W. Robinson, (eds.) Gender in the 1990s, p. 36) . 
4. Nataf, p. 17. (I have both adapted and extended his list here.) 
5. "Third sex" refers to people who define themselves as neither male nor female, but instead as belonging to another gendered group. 
There are historical instances of societies which have a third gender group, such as the hijra in India. For this and other examples, see 
Ramet, 1996 and Feinberg, 1996. "Two-spirited" is a term used by some native North American cultures to refer to people understood 
to have both male and female qualities. Some transgendered people have adopted this self-definition. "Intersex" refers to those whose 
sex at birth is not readily defined as either male or female, usually because the baby had full or partial genitals of both sexes. Typically, 
these children receive surgery and/or hormonal treatment to conform to either male or female anatomy. "Androgyne" refers to someone 
whose sex is not readily apparent, often someone who combines both male and female gender characteristics, or who avoids gender 
presentation altogether. "Epicene" is the least familiar of these terms, but gaining popularity. It is both adjective and noun, and means 
"partaking of the characteristics of both sexes; common to both sexes; worn or inhabited by both sexes." 
6. The Standards of Care: The Hormonal and Surgical Sex Reassignment of Gender Dysphoric Persons were developed by the 
founding committee of the Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association in 1979 (Walker et al., 1979). Pat Califia 
offers some insightful commentary on the historical shaping of medical conventions in the "treatment" of transgendered people in Sex 
Changes (Califia 1996, Ch.2 especially). 
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